Recent Decisions by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 Article 17 
1963 
Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1963) "Recent Decisions," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 15 : Iss. 2 , Article 17. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/17 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATIONS - EVIDENCE - Is the Attorney-
Client Privilege Available to Corporations? -
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n (N. D. Ill.
1962), City of of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
(E. D. Pa. 1962).
In a civil antitrust suit the plaintiff sought to inspect
various documents which were held by the counsel represent-
ing the defendant corporation. The corporation contended
that the documents were protected by the attorney-client
privilege and were not subject to inspection by the plaintiff.
HELD: The attorney-client privilege does not extend to, and
cannot be asserted by, a corporation. Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N. D. Ill. 1962),
supplementing a prior opinion 207 F. Supp. 771.
Shortly after the Radiant Burners decision the same ques-
tion arose in a Pennsylvania District Court, Judge Kirk-
patrick handing down the opinion. The defendant, a corpora-
tion, refused to answer interrogatories submitted by the plain-
tiff asserting that the information was protected by the at-
torney-client privilege from disclosure to the plaintiff. The
information had been acquired by the defendant corporation's
counsel from an employee of the corporation. HELD: The
attorney-client privilege may be asserted by a corporation.
The communication in the instant case, however, did not
come within the requirements of the privilege. City of Phila-
delphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E. D.
Pa. 1962).
The attorney-client privilege has long been applied to cor-
porations.' It is doubtful whether any courts have expressly
decided that the privilege applies to corporations; rather
they have assumed that the privilege did so extend and have
then proceeded to apply it to the particular case at hand.
2
1. Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 Ati. 245
(1895).
2. "Uf the attorney-client privilege is to extend to corporations as it
does... ." Stewart Equip. Ce. v. Gallo, 107 A. 2d 527 (N. J. Super. Ct.);
Russell v. Second Nat'l Bank of Patterson, 136 N. J. L. 270, 55 A. 2d 211
(N. J. Ct. Err. & App. 1947).
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Several courts have clearly indicated that specific discussion
and decision on this issue was unnecessary.3 Mr. Justice Day,
speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, stated
in a dictum:
The desirability of protecting confidential communica-
tions between attorney and client as a matter of public
policy is too well known and has been too often recognized
by textbooks and courts to need extended comment now.
If such communications were required to be made the
subject of examination and publication, such enactment
would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice
and assistance.
4
In using the word "client" the Court was referring to a
corporation, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company.
The Court cited two cases to support the above statement.5
Both of the cases cited concerned an individual rather than
corporation as the "client." This seems to be a strong indica-
tion that the Court felt that there was no valid distinction be-
tween a corporation and an individual when considering the
application of the attorney-client privilege and furthermore
that the privilege did apply to a corporation.
The attorney-client privilege may be stated as follows:
Communications made in confidence by a client to his profes-
sional legal advisor for the purpose of seeking legal advice
are protected from disclosure by either party unless the client
waive the privilege.6
In order to exercise his legal rights a person should be
able to freely consult an attorney. A client would not be
3. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 236 U. S. 318, 59
L. Ed. 598 (1915); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F.
Supp. 251 (N. D. N. Y. 1960); "That communications between client and
counsel, ... are privileged, is, of course, undisputed." Lalance & Grojean
1Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563, 564 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1898).
4. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., supra note 3, at
336, 59 L. Ed. at 607.
5. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. Ed.
251 (1877); Blackburn v. Crawford, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 175, 18 L. Ed.
186 (1866).
6. Wigmore states the rule as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.
8 WiGMoma EvmECE §2292 at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2
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likely to disclose all the relevant facts if he knew the attorney
could be compelled to divulge them. In order to encourage
full disclosure of the facts to the attorney and thereby facili-
tate justice, the client's fear of disclosure by the attorney
should be eliminated. This apprehension may be eliminated
by giving the client a privilege which protects his communica-
tions to his attorney and permits disclosure only with the
client's consent.1 Thus the basis of the privilege is public
policy. This same policy requires that the privilege be ex-
tended to corporations, which are in need of legal assistance
as much as, if not more than, individuals.
While it is true that the privilege against self-incrimination
is denied corporations,8 it does not follow that the attorney-
client privilege should likewise be withheld from them. The
policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination
- to protect against the possibility of physical abuse and to
require the government to bear the burden of making out a
case against the individual9 - do not necessitate the granting
of the privilege against self-incrimination to corporations.
The rationale of the attorney-client privilege - to promote
effective legal assistance - applies equally to individuals and
to corporations. Therefore, while the privilege against self-
incrimination has remained an individual privilege, the at-
torney-client privilege has been applied to both individuals
and corporations.
There are problems which are encountered when applying
the attorney-client privilege to corporations which do not
arise in its application to an individual. The most perplexing
ones are the requirement that the communication be confi-
dential and the difficulty of determining who is the client,
that is to say, who within the corporation personifies the
corporation.
In the case of an individual client, the presence of a party
who is not necessary for the communication will prevent the
communication from being within the privilege.'0 Also, if
7. For a thorough discussion of reasons for, and against, the granting
of the attorney-client privilege see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDFNcE §2291.
8. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 55 L. Ed. 771 (1911); Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652.
9. See generally 8 WIGMoRE, EviDENC, §2251. In all, twelve reasons
are given for providing the privilege against self-incrimination. The two
given above seem to be the most important.
10. Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F. 2d 749 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F. R. D. 448 (S. D. N. Y. 1955).
[Vol. 15
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the communication though made in confidence later ceases
to be confidential, the privilege will no longer apply.1 In the
case of a corporation, will the privilege apply if the communi-
cation is merely kept confidential within the corporation?
Some courts have applied the privilege if the communication
was withheld from "third persons" or "strangers."'12 Judge
Leahy defined strangers as "those not affiliated with the
corporation as employees, officers, directors, or outside coun-
sel." 3 Other courts state that the communication must re-
main exclusively in the possession of the attorney, 4 thereby
indicating that the communication cannot be circulated freely
within the corporation and retain its confidential character.
Still other courts allow the communication to follow the
normal flow of reports within the corporation 15 and also
allow the report to be disclosed to other interested agents of
the corporation.' 6 This is apparently the best solution. It
affords the corporation the practical use of the privilege
without allowing the privilege to extend to so many persons
as to make the result unconscionable.
The privilege applies only to a client seeking legal advice.
17
Therefore the second problem is to determine who personifies
the corporation when seeking the legal advice. Judge Wyzan-
ski in United Shoe allowed the privilege to extend to "infor-
mation which was secured from an officer or employee of
defendant"' 8 and thus seems to permit anyone employed by
the corporation to personify the corporation. Judge Leahy
also seems to have followed this broad interpretation of
"client" laid down in United Shoe.19 However, this broad
interpretation of "client" appears to be in conflict with the
distinction made between employee and "client" in Hickman
11. Hager v. Shindler, 29 Cal. 47 (1865).
12. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792,
795 (D. Del. 1954); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 361 (D. Mass. 1950).
13. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, supra note 12, at
795.
14. Davies v. Columbia Gas and Elec. Co., 68 N. E. 2d 571 (Ohio Ct.
of C. P. 1938).
15. Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 Atl. 245
(1895).
16. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.
D. N. Y. 1960).
17. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 554.
18. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 361
(D. Mass. 1950).
19. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792,
795 (D. Del. 1954).
1963]
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v. Taylor.20 In Hickman the Supreme Court refused to apply
the attorney-client privilege to an employee of a partnership
and treated the employee as merely a third party or a witness
rather than as a client. Thus it seems that the privilege does
not extend to all employees of a corporation. Various tests
have been proposed to determine whether the person making
the communication is the client or merely a third party. The
best test seems to be that laid down by Judge Kirkpatrick
in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Coarp. Thus
If the employee making the communications, of what-
ever rank he may be, is in a position to control or even
to take a substantial part in a decision about any action
which the corporation may take upon the advice of the
attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or
group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is
(or personifies) the corporation when he makes his dis-
closure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.21
Since the purpose of the privilege is to permit one to obtain
legal advice without fear of compelled disclosure of the com-
munication by the attorney, the privilege should extend to
everyone within the corporation who can control any action
which may be a result of the legal advice thus obtained. By
allowing the privilege to so extend, the goal of the privilege
will be attained.
Prior to Radiant Burners the attorney-client privilege has,
without exception, been available to corporations and it should
not now be denied them. The "confidential" requirement
should be satisfied if the communication does not go outside
the usual channel of communications within the corporation;
any employee who is in a position to control the action the
corporation may take upon receiving the legal advice is a
"client" thereby allowing the privilege to extend to the cor-
poration.
WAYNE F. RUSH
20. Hickrnan v. Taylor, 829 U. S. 495, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).
21. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp.
483 (E. D. Pa. 1962).
[Vol. 15
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CORPORATIONS - Right of Record-holder of Stock to
Bring Action for Appraisal in Behalf of the True
Owner. Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Corp.
(N. J. 1962).
Plaintiff, a brokerage firm, was the registered owner of
33,400 shares of defendant corporation, and held the shares
in its name on behalf of various clients. Upon an investor's
request, plaintiff notified defendant of the investor's objec-
tion to a proposed merger and of plaintiff's intention to
vote a number of shares against the merger in the name of
various equitable owners at a forthcoming meeting of share-
holders.
A statutory majority of stockholders approved the merger.
Plaintiff voted 2,804 shares against the merger and the re-
maining shares for the merger, and thereafter demanded an
appraisal for the dissenting shares. Defendant denied plain-
tiff's right to an appraisal and plaintiff sought relief in a
New Jersey chancery court which upheld the record-holder's
appraisal right. Defendant appealed on the grounds that (1)
plaintiff was not entitled to an appraisal because it was not
the beneficial owner of the dissenting shares, and (2) plain-
tiff lost its appraisal rights by voting some of its shares for
the merger. HELD: (1) Because the word "stockholder" in
the New Jersey appraisal statute refers to the record-holder
of stock, a brokerage firm owning stock of record for inves-
tors is entitled to appraisal rights. (2) The failure of a rec-
ord-holder to vote unanimously is not fatal to a demand for
appraisal. Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Corp., 74 N. J.
Super. 92, 180 A. 2d 535 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 38 N. J.
181, 183 A. 2d 87 (1962).
The court of New Jersey followed the majority of the states
in determining the right of the registered stockholder to
bring an action for appraisal. Such a right has been repeat-
edly upheld in states which have enacted corporation statutes
patterned upon the Model Corporation Act.' In the absence
of specific statute, courts are in conflict as to the inclusive-
ness of the word "shareholder" or "stockholder" as applied
to the appraisal statute. The New York courts in construing
a similar statute allowed both the record owner ahd the bene-
1. The American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Co., 136 A. 2d 690
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ficial owner of shares to demand an appraisal. 2 The courts
of Delaware however have construed the statute to give the
right exclusively to the record-holder. The court relied heav-
ily on the leading case of Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck
which held that, "An unregistered holder of stock is not a
stockholder entitled to intervene in intra-corporate matters,
unless that status is given him expressly or by unavoidable
intendment: and consequently only the registered holder of
stock is a 'stockholder' within the sense of the word as used
in section 61 (now section 262) of the law, entitled to object
to a proposed agreement of merger."3 The Pennsylvania ap-
praisal statute specifically allows only the record-holder of
stock to bring an action of appraisal.4 The South Carolina
Business Corporation Act of 1962 defines the term "share-
holder" to mean one who is a holder of record of the shares
in a corporation." This statute clearly gives the record-holder
of stock the right to an appraisal, but does not specify wheth-
er or not this remedy is exclusive. Since section 12-16.26, per-
taining to inspection of corporate records, makes specific ref-
erence to beneficial owners 6 while section 12-16.27, the rights
to appraisal section, makes no reference to a right of the
beneficial owner, it seems that right of appraisal is an ex-
clusive right of the record-holder.
Since the purpose of the statute is to protect the interest
of the dissenting shareholder by allowing an appraisal of his
shares, and to provide notice to a corporation so that it may
expeditiously determine the number of dissenting shares7
there is no justification for refusing to honor the record-
holder's demand for appraisal. Neither the minority dissent-
ing shareholder nor the corporation is injured by such proce-
dure. The non-registered stockholder at his option may or
may not record the transfer of his shares, and the corpora-
tion may rely on these records.8 Further, the corporation is
not injured if the record-holder informs the corporation in
due time of the number of dissenting shares he represents.
2. In re Kaufmann, Alsberg & Co., 130 Misc. 2d 1025, 220 N. Y. S.
2d 151 (1961). In the Matter of Bazar, 183 Misc. 736, 50 N. Y. S. 521
(1944).
3. Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A. 2d 583, 589 (Del. 1945).
4. In re Kreher, 379 Pa. 313, 108 A. 2d 708 (1954).
5. S. C. CODE §12-11.2(g) (Supp. 1962).
6. S. C. CODE §12-16.26 (Supp. 1962).
7. Zeeb v. Atlas Powder Co., 87 A. 2d 123 (Del. 1952).
8. In re Northeastern Water Co., 21 A. 2d 918 (Del. Ch. 1944).
[Vol. 15
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The corporation will then be able to judge the probable cash
payments and, on the vote, count the number of shares for
and against the merger. One Delaware court refused ap-
praisal to a beneficial owner holding that the unregistered
-stockholder is not entitled to inject himself into intracorpo-
rate matters even on an equitable basis.9 Thus there is no
legal or equitable basis for refusing a record-holder of stock
the right to demand appraisal. The contention of the defen-
-dant corporation that only the beneficial owner is entitled to
-an appraisal is not supported by authority or by practical
-considerations. The corporation would be placed in the awk-
-ward position of not knowing which persons had a right to
demand an appraisal of their stock. Exclusive appraisal rights
to the record-holder relieves the corporation from that risk
and uncertainty.
Secondly, the fact that plaintiff voted for and against the
merger should not be fatal to a demand for appraisal. The
purpose of the statute was effected when the corporation was
notified that the plaintiff held dissenting shares and those
shares were voted against the merger. To nullify the rights
of the dissenting shares because other shares held in the
plaintiff's name were voted for the merger would cause the
dissenting shareholders to lose a right clearly given to them
in the appraisal statute. Some courts tend to favor the share-
holder seeking appraisal whenever there is doubt arising
from a lack of precision and accuracy in the statute.10 Such
liberal construction is proposed in order to avoid complexi-
ties particularly when the corporation will not be subjected
to risks of liability.". These statutes have deprived the share-
holder of his common law right to prevent a consolidation
and should be liberally construed in favor of the shareholder
as compensation for the loss of that right. 2 A recent Dela-
ware case reached the same result as did the New Jersey
court. The New Jersey court, however, confined their
decision to the broker-customer relationship which they
regarded as requiring special treatment. There was noth-
ing in that court's opinion to effect that any share-
holder other than a broker had the right to an ap-
9. Coyne v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 155 A. 2d 238 (Del. Ch. 1959).
10. In re Camden Trust Co., 1 A. 2d 475 (N. J. 1938).
11. In re Jansenn Dairy Corp., 64 A. 2d 652 (N. J. Super. 1949).
12. Schenley Indus. v. Curtis, 152 A. 2d 300 (Del. 1959). In re Uni-
versal Pictures Co., 37 A. 2d 615 (Del. Ch. 1945).
1963]
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praisal even though he had voted some of his shares
in favor of the merger. The Delaware court did not agree
that the appraisal statute was specifically designed to pro-
tect the beneficial owner's rights, citing Salt Dome Oil Corp,
v. Schenck.13 The Delaware court found nothing in the lan-
guage of the statute which indicated whether or not a stock-
holder may split the vote of his shares, nor was there express
or implied denial of appraisal to a stockholder who voted
some of his shares in favor of a merger. The possibility of
delay and insufficient time for transfer to the beneficial
owner, the transfer taxes and extra bookkeeping were prac-
tical considerations which influenced the court in reaching its
conclusions. 1
4
The South Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1962
omitted the section of the Draft Version which allowed a
shareholder to dissent to less than all the shares registered
in his name while permitting the remaining shares to be
treated as if they were registered in the name of different
shareholders.r This provision in the Draft Version antici-
pated and would have clearly resolved the problem of vote-
splitting. However, this omission indicates legislative intent
that a registered shareholder may not split his vote on a
merger. The omitted provision would have enhanced the ef-
fectiveness of the appraisal statute and would have been equi-
table to both the dissenting minority shareholder and the
majority shareholder. Allowing brokerage houses to vote
without causing the minority dissenting shareholder to lose
his right to appraisal is a practical consideration necessary
to modern corporate practice and security transactions.
ROBERT L. WALDREP, JR.
13. Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A. 2d 583 (Del. 1945).
14. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Reynolds Metals, 185 A. 2d 754 (Del.
Ch. 1962).
15. S. C. Bus. CORP. ACT OF 1962, DRAFr VERsioN §6.27(j).
CONFLICT OF LAWS - Corporate Internal Affairs
South Carolina Position - Western Airlines v. Sobiesk.
Plaintiff, Western Airlines, Inc., (Western) is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business and 30% of
its shareholders in California.' Its original predecessor was
1. Its original predecessor was incorporated in California in 1925;
thereafter, in 1928, Western was incorporated in Delaware. Then in 1929,
582 [Vol. 15
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incorporated in California in 1925; thereafter, in 1928, West-
ern was incorporated in Delaware. Then in 1929, Western,
under a permit granted by the California Corporations Com-
missioner, exchanged its shares for all of the shares of its
California predecessor, under the condition that the share-
holders of the California corporation would not suffer by
the exchange. In California it is mandatory that domestic
corporations have cumulative voting, but in Delaware it is
permissive.2  Western's Delaware charter had carried for-
ward cumulative voting until 1956 when its board of direc-
tors resolved to eliminate cumulative voting for directors and
began proceedings in compliance with relevant Delaware
laws to amend the certificate of incorporation. After proxies
against cumulative voting were sent to each shareholder, the
Commissioner advised Western that in his opinion the pro-
posed amendment of the articles of incorporation would con-
stitute a "sale or exchange" of securities," and, further,
that Western should not engage in the solicitation of proxies
or hold shareholders' meetings for the purpose of amending
the articles until Western had applied for and received a
permit from the Commissioner authorizing such action.4
Western applied for such a permit, reserving expressly the
right to question the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to
require such a permit. The Commissioner granted a nego-
tiating permit, but reserved his decision on the issue of "fair-
ness"5 and conditioned the issuance of the permit upon non-
filing of the proposed amendment with the Secretary of State
of Delaware until a further permit was so granted. While com-
plying with the permit, Western received a majority vote of
Western, under a permit granted by the California Corporations Com-
missioner, exchanged its shares for all of the shares of its California
predecessor, but only under the condition that the shareholders of the
California Corporation would not be hurt in any way by the exchange.
Since 1929 Western was recognized and submitted to the continuing
jurisdiction of the California Corporations Commissioner. Hence, the
Commissioner presently has jurisdiction to hold that the original agree-
ment, being made in California, tacitly binds Western not to change cumu-
lative voting without the Commissioner's approval. Could not these facts
have created the sole grounds for the decision, there being in the Com-
mission a continuance of jurisdiction over a contract made in California?
2. Nineteen other states provide, by constitution or statute, for man-
datory cumulative voting: South Carolina, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho,
Illinois. Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
3. CAL. CoRP. CoDE .25009 (a).
4. CAL. CORP. CODE4 25500.
.. CAL. CORP. CODE §25510.
1963] 583
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the shares in favor of eliminating cumulative voting. After ap-
plication for a supplemental permit, a hearing on the fair-
ness of the proposed amendment was held by the Commis-
sioner, who made detailed findings of unfair and inequitable
actions by Western and denied the permit. After being de-
nied a rehearing, Western filed its complaint for adminis-
trative review and for writ of mandate. The Superior Court,
Los Angeles County, rendered a judgment for Western solely
upon the grounds that the Commissioner had exceeded his
jurisdiction. The District Court of Appeal unanimously held
for the Commissioner, stating that any change in voting
rights of California shareholders attempted by Western was
a "sale" within California Corporation Code which includes
within that term any change in the rights, preferences, or
privileges on outstanding securities, that the Commissioner
had jurisdiction to hold a hearing on such a change and to
prevent such a change if he found it unfair, unjust, or inequi-
table to all security holders affected. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12
Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).6
The Superior Court agreed with Western that this was not
a "sale or exchange" of stock, and that it was an internal
affair over which the Commissioner had no jurisdiction.7
The District Court of Appeal in reversing this finding stated
this was a "sale,"" and that even if the internal affairs of
Western are admittedly in issue the Commissioner and the
courts of California clearly have jurisdiction in the instant
case." Broken down into two main issues, the problem would
6. Case Comments: 1962 DuKE L J.. 109; 46 CALIF. L. Rav. 974
1958); 46 MINN. L. REv. 785 (1961-62); 9 U. C. L. A. L. REV. 242
1962).
7. Western relied on Transportation Bldg. Co. v. Daugherty, 74 Cal.
App. 2d 604, 169 P. 2d 470 (1946) and Southern Sierras Power Co. v.
Railroad Conm'n, 205 Cal. 479, 271 Pac. 747 (1928). See generally 18
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§8425-45 (1960).
8. "Many cases held that where the Corporate Securities Act is
violated by solicitation of sales of stock in California, the Corporate
Securities Act applies even though issuance of the stock and the transfer
of title are to take place in a foreign state." People v. Rankin, 169 Cal.
App. 2d 150, 337 P. 2d 182 (1959). See note 9 infr . People v. Sears, 138
Cal. App. 2d 773, 791, 292 P. 2d 663 (1956).
9. Gillis v. Pan Am. W. Petroleum Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 249, 44 P. 2d
311 (1935) "Conceding therefore the premise of respondents' argument
that ordinarily speaking the issuance of capital stock or the stock structure
of a corporation is an internal affair, yet the issuance and sale of stock
within a state other than that of its organzation may be regulated in
order to protect the residents and citizens of the former state." See also
Edward v. Ioor, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620 (1919), 15 A. L. R. 256
(1929) and note 34 infra.
[Vol. 1
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be: first, whether or not the California Corporation Code
has granted such jurisdictional authority to the Corporations
Commissioner, and second, whether or not California, or any
state, can grant jurisdiction, as here, to its courts to apply its
laws to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
The first question can be clearly answered in the affirmative.
A fair and impartial reading of the pertinent Corpora-
tion Code sections convinces us that the amendment here
sought by Western is a "change in the rights, prefer-
ences, privileges, or restrictions on outstanding securities"
(Calif. Corp. Code §25009) of such nature as to be within
the contemplation of the Legislature upon enactment of
those sections. 10
Obviously, the state statute must be drafted broadly
enough to bring within the court's jurisdiction the
particular acts and circumstances of each case." In the in-
stant case the situation and circumstances involved are the
internal affairs of a foreign corporation. Hence, the statute
of each state would have to be carefully examined to see if
her courts have been denied or granted jurisdiction over sit-
uations involving such matters.12 Note that section 99 of the
Model Act provides that "nothing in this act contained shall
be construed to authorize this state to regulate the organi-
zation or the internal affairs of such corporation." In con-
10. The code grants the Commissioner authority to require a permit for
such a change, and authority to refuse a permit where the change is not
fair and equitable to all security holders affected. CAL. CoRp. CODE
§§25500, 25510.
11. The Alabama Substitute Service Statute did not authorize per-
sonal service upon nonresident corporation, based on publication of an
alleged libelous article published in New York based on five days spent
by individual defendant in Alabama gathering news. New York Times Co.
v. Conner, 291 F. 2d 494 (5th Cir. 1961). See McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957); International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), 44 A. L. R. 2d
416 (1955). For an elaborate review of South Carolina decisions see
Shealy v. lMffg. Co., 304 F. 2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962). South Carolina has
broadly interpreted its statutes. Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co.,
237 S. C. 54, 115 S. E. 2d 508 (1960) of. Hudgins v. Tug Kevin Moran,
206 F. Supp. 339 (S. D. Miss. 1962); Ross v. American Life Ins. Co.,
232 S. C. 433, 102 S. E. 2d 743 (1958).
12. See Hanson v. Denchla (5-4 decision), 357 U. S. 235, 2 L. Ed.
1283 (1958), for the outer limits of International Shoe and McGee, note
11 supra. Since there was found no jurisdiction in rem, the court stated
there must be personal jurisdiction in Florida over the Delaware trustee.
The majority of the court found there was no personal jurisdiction over
the trustee because there were not the minimum contacts required, and
because under Florida law a trustee must be within the court's jurisdiction
before it has power to enter a judgment in a proceeding affecting the
validity of a trust,
1963]
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trast, the New York Business Corporations Law has express-
ly provided statutory provisions for control over internal
affairs of "domiciled foreign corporations."' 3 The South
Carolina Business Corporations Act of 1962 contains no such
statutory provisions as New York, but it omits the Model
Act clause.1 4 The theory for this intermediate position is
Version:
Although we do not now need such a provision, (as in
N. Y.) we should not hamstring our own courts (as
in the Model Act) in meeting a situation which might
later justify intervention of South Carolina courts....
It may very well be that a corporation, incorporated
elsewhere, consists exclusively or primarily of South
Carolina shareholders, and that such corporation pro-
poses an internal change which is contrary to South
Carolina law, is injurious to South Carolina shareholders,
but which is yet lawful under the law of the state in
which the corporation is formally organized. . . . In
short, there is no reason to cut off a beneficient juris-
diction of our courts should it be necessary to invoke
that jurisdiction.' 5
Hence, under the new statute, there is no express legislative
inhibitions upon the internal affairs of foreign corporations,
but the South Carolina Legislature has deemed it advisable to
leave jurisdiction of such matters in the hands of its courts.
It should be clearly understood that the jurisdiction spoken
of is that which makes a court competent to hear and ad-
judicate a case. Such jurisdiction does not create an
absolute right in the courts to apply the statutes and laws
of its forum state, there being constitutional limitations upon
the right of a state to apply her own laws to extra-territorial
matters.' 0 Hence, at this point it is only clear that the South
Carolina courts are competent to exercise jurisdiction in such
matters.17 In the past, courts have generally refused to en-
13. N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. §§1317-1320 (1961).
14. MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT §99 (1953).
stated in the Reporter's Note to Section 13.1 of the Draft
15. REPoRTEn's NOTE to DRAFT VERSION §13.1, S. C. Bus. CORP. ACT
(1962).
16. Jones v. Re-Mine Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 832, 119 P. 2d 219
1941); Robbins v. Pacific E. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 2d 241, 65 P. 2d 42
1937). See notes 29 and 42 infra.
17. See note 15 supra.
Vol. 15
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tertain a suit involving internal affairs.' 8 "The cogency of
the reasons for refusing jurisdiction in the ordinary case is
apparent. They are the sort of reasons that support a forum
non conveniens rule in any case.' 9 But there may be many
lawsuits to which such reasons are inapplicable.
20
Modern courts clearly recognize their jurisdiction to
entertain such suits, and insist merely upon a discre-
tionary power to refuse to exercise the existent juris-
diction when the facts make it both feasible and more
desirable for the case to be heard by a court of the state
of incorporation.21
The second issue is the presence of constitutional limita-
tions upon the authority of a state to apply its own statutes
and laws extra-territorially, especially to the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation.22 Broadly stated, the legal effect
of an act is governed by the laws of the place of occurrence,
e.g., the state where a tort occurs, or the state where a con-
tract is made, or to be performed. 23 Perhaps, the most im-
portant recent theory is one based upon essential contacts
with the forum state.24 It is true that
18. Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan, 198 Cal. 618, 630-31,
246 Pac. 796, 800-01 (1926); Miles v. Woodward, 115 Cal. 308, 311, 46
Pac. 1076, 1077 (1896). See note 7 supra.
19. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 77 L .Ed. 652 (1933);
See Forum Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the Internal Affairs Rule,
58 COLUm. L. Rzv. 234 (1958).
20. See Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 91
L. Ed. 1067 (1947).
21. LEFLAR, CoNFLICT OF LAWS §99 (1959). See Koster v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Gas Co., supra note 20; Harding v. American Glucose Co., 183 Ill.
551, 55 N. E. 577 (1899), 64 L. R. A. 738; Sanders v. Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co., 250 Minn. 265, 84 N. W. 2d 919 (1902). See the dissenting
opinions of Justices Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis in Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co., supra note 19.
22. A state has the power, subject to constitutional limitations, to
prohibit foreign corporations from doing intrastate business except upon
compliance with state law. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S.
562, 93 L. Ed. 1544 (1949). Since the Blue Sky Cases there has been
no doubt that under this power a stat can regulate the sale of securities
within its borders by foreign and domestic corporations. Merrick v. N. W.
Halsey and Co., 242 U. 5. 568, 61 L. Ed. 498 (1917). California is the
only state to have legislatively extended the definition of "sale" to include
changes in the rights of outstanding securities. Cowett, Reorganizations,
Consolidations, Mergers and Related Corporate Events Under the Blue-
Sky Laws, 13 Bus. LAW. 418, 426 (1958). See 9 U. C. L. A. L. REv. 242,
243 (1962) and note 16 supra.
23. See note 24 infra; Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. St. Rep.
241 (1878); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§377-379 (torts); §§311-
376, 413-416, 418, 422424 (contracts) (1958).
24. Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962).
In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated, "The general con-
14
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(t) he ultra vires nature of any particular activity is
fixed by the corporation's charter and the law under
which it was granted.25  But even though a certain act
be not ultra vires by the law of the place of incorpora-
tion, it still may be unpermitted by the law of the place
where it is sought to do the act, in which case the act
may not be lawfully done.26 A Nevada corporation validly
created to operate gambling houses would not be per-
mitted to do so in Kansas if the Kansas law forbade the
operation of such houses27
But, in the instant case, Western attacks the authority to so.
regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.2 8 Such
internal matters, as the relationship between a corporation and
its shareholders, are determined by the law of the state of in-
corporation,20 and the majority rule is that all such questions
flict-of laws rule, followed by a vast majority of the states, is to apply
the RX- STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§377, 378, and 391 (1958). See
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 263-246 (3rd ed. 1949); 25 C. J. S. Death
§28, NN 27-30 (1941). However ....... "(r)ecently there has been a
tendency in order to take into account the interests of the State having
significant contact with the parties to the litigation." Grant v. McAuliffe,.
41 Cal. App. 2d 859, 264 P. 2d 944 (1953), 42 A. L. R. 2d 1162; Schmidt v.
Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N. W. 2d 365 (1957). Cf., Vrooman v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F. 2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950); Levy v. Daniels'
U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928), 61 A. L. R.
846; Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1938).; See Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U. S. 408, 99 L. Ed. 1183 (1955); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U. S. 66, 99 L. Ed. 74 (1954); Pacific Employers.
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493, 83 L. Ed. 940 (1939);
Home Is. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 74 L. Ed. 926 (1930), 74 A. L. R.
701; Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F. Supp. 2d 553 (2nd Cir. 1962).
25. St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 145 U. S.
393, 36 L. Ed, 748 (1892); Binghampton Trust Co. v. Auten, 68 Ark. 294,
57 5. W. 936 (1900). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §156 (1958).
26. "For example, a foreign corporation, even though authorized by.
its charter to exercise powers of eminent domain, may not do so in
Arkansas." Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Patterson Orchard Co., 180
Ark. 148, 20 S. W. 2d 636 (1929). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS-
§165 (1958).
27. LEFLAIt, CONFLICT OF LAWS §95 (1959).
28. Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice-
of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118'
(958).
29. "This applies to such matters as the shareholder's right to divi-
dends, his right to participate in the management of the corporation
by voting at stockholders' meetings or otherwise, his liability on unpaid
subscriptions, his subjection to assessments or double liability by reason
of his being a shareholder, the existence and nature of possible preemptive-
rights in other stock or the properties of the corporation, and every other
relational right and duty which grows out of the fact of his being a
stockholder." LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS §97 (1959); See Hale v. Allin-
son, 188 U. S. 56, 47 L. Ed. 380 (1903); Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum,
176 U. S. 640, 44 L. Ed. 619 (1900); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§182-186 (1958).
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are governed by the laws of the incorporating state.3° How-
ever, where, as in the instant case, there are substantial con-
tacts with the forum state, then there can be no constitutional
objections to the application of the forum state's statutes and
laws in a valid exercise of her police power to protect a legit-
imate interest in state policies and state citizens.3 1 If all of
the activities involved in the instant case were extra-terri-
torial to California, then its courts must give full faith and
credit to the applicable Delaware statute authorizing such an
internal change, 32 but this was not the case in Western. It
is also true that the California courts have allowed certain
other internal changes under the doctrine of comity,33 but
this is only true in the absence of express constitutional or
statutory inhibitions against such changes or activities.8 4 The
court in Western declared that the comity argument by the
plaintiff was not "sufficiently cogent to invalidate the Cor-
porations Securities Act sections here involved,"8 5 and that
the state of essential contacts may legislate through its
police power to protect its citizens.386
Is it the intent of the South Carolina Legislature that there
are to be no express statutory inhibitions against corporate
internal activities which are lawfully authorized in the in-
corporation state?3 7 Absent express statutory inhibitions, the
30. Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 69 L. Ed.
783 (1925), 41 A. L. R. 1384; Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531,
59 L. Ed. 1089 (1915).
31. State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 La. 1298, 31 N. W. 2d 853
1948), 8 A. L. R. 2d 1162, cert. denied, 337 U. S. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1728
1949); Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 Yale L. J. 137 (1956). See
notes 24 supra and 34 infra.
32. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 612, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1951);
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 74 L. Ed. 796 (1930); Jones v.
Re-Mine Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 832, 119 P. 2d 219 (1941).
33. Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan, 198 Cal. 618, 246
Pac. 796 (1926).
34. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U. S. 66, 99 L. Ed.
74 (1954) ; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 61 L. Ed. 480 (1917),
L. R. A. 1917 F. 514, ANN. CAS. 1917c, 643; Williams v. Gaylord, 186
U. S. 157, 46 L. Ed. 1102 (1902); London, Paris, & Am. Bank v. Aron-
stein, 117 Fed. 601 (9th Cir. 1902); Hohn v. Peters, 216 Cal. App. 406,
14 P. 2d 519 (1932) ; Hayden Plan Co. v. Freidlander, 97 Cal. App. 12-16,
275 Pac. 248, 253 (1929); In re Flesher, 81 Cal. App. 128, 252 Pac. 1057
(1927). Note 31 supra.
35. See note 33 supra.
36. See note 31 supra. To hold otherwise, "... then the concept of
full faith and credit is being utilized as an extraordinary example of op-
pressiveness to legitimate and lawful state interests." Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, 309 F. 2d 553 (2nd Cir. 1962).
37. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
16
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South Carolina courts will be free to exercise or deny comity
since this is discretionary with the forum state.3s Moreover
no valid claim of denial of full faith and credit can be as-
serted when the forum state protects its valid interests.3 9 It
would be reasonable for the South Carolina courts to follow
Western Airlines and require corporations having substantial
South Carolina contacts to comply with South Carolina poli-
cies before they may conduct their activities in South Caro-
lina.40
There may be many more constitutional attacks upon the
application of the laws of the forum state41 in such matters
that create the illusion of extra-territorial legislation, but
there will be little chance of success where there is a legit-
imate finding of the essential contacts with the forum state.
42
'The extent to which a state may constitutionally legislate to
protect state interest is vividly seen in the recent U. S. Su-
preme Court decision which upheld a Louisiana statute al-
lowing a direct suit against a foreign insurance company (in
direct conflict with provisions of the incorporating state),
and conditioned such foreign corporation's doing business
38. See notes 33 and 34 supra.
39. See note 31 supra.
40. "The fiction of Delaware residence should yield to the totality of
California contacts so as to require, in addition to compliance with the
Delaware law, the approval of the California Corporations Commissioner
as a condition to eliminating the right of cumulative voting by the share-
holders." Western Airlines v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 719 (1961). See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, note 24 supra; In
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. Ed.
1044 (1935) the court repudiated the assumption that the law of one
and only one State must govern the whole of any transaction.
41. "We also have no doubt that, although such a regulation may im-
pose some restraint on interstate commerce and place some restrictions on
free speech, it is a valid exercise of the State's police power, and is not
unconstitutional." B. C. Turf. & Country Club v. Daugherty, 94 Cal. App.
2d 320, 210 P. 2d 760, 767 (1949).
42. See 46 MINN. L. Ruv. 785, 791, n. 25 (1961): "(g)enerally, in
choice of law, due process does not require more than that a state refrain
from applying its own law when it has no interest in the controversy.
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930). When a state has a legiti-
mate interest, due process does not require application of foreign law,
regardless of the conflicting interest of other states. Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U. S. 66, 70-73 (1954); Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 294 U. S. 532, 540-42 (1935). Full
faith and credit likewise does not seem to require a balancing of interests,
for 'there would seem to be little room for the exercise of that function
when the statute of the forum is the expression of domestic policy, in terms
declared to be exclusive in its application to persons and events within the
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within the state upon submission to service of process upon
its agent in the state.43 The court rejected the argument that
such statute was violative of the equal protection, contract,
due process, and full-faith and credit clauses of the constitu-
tion and "realistically recognized that a state has a legitimate
interest in safeguarding the rights of persons injured there
even though certain of the activities affected occurred beyond
its boundaries. ' 44 Such legislative enactments generally op-
eate equally upon foreign corporations and domestic corpora-
tions; however, there may be discrimination where reason-
ably designed to promote a proper purpose and not arbitrarily
enacted.
5
It is understandable and reasonable that a state with the
prerequisite minimum contacts should not be denied its in-
herent power to protect state policies and citizens. The bal-
ancing process takes considerable reflection. In considering
the minimum contacts required, the state must have juris-
diction over the subject matter in controversy, e.g., the in-
jury, debt, contract, et cetera-and, upon finding the state
statute sufficiently broad, the contacts also must be such as
to allow service of process upon the defendant.46 The deci-
sion to apply the forum state's internal law must be reason-
able and unarbitrary, and the state's public interest in the
matter should be high.47 Such conflict-of-laws problems may
arise as to any matter at any time and in any state. In New
York the necessity of acquiring new corporate activity is
obviously not as strong as in South Carolina. Admirably
however, South Carolina does not desire corporate activity to
the extent that it would sacrifice its beneficial jurisdiction
43. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U. S. 66, 99 L. Ed.
74 (1954).
44. U. S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; art. 1; §10; art 4, §1. See Pearson
v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F. 2d 553 (2nd Cir. 1962) and note 42 supra.
45. A state has broad discretion in matters of classification. U. S.
CONsT. amend. XIV; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. Ed. 299
(1935); Bordens Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. Ed.
281 (1934).
46. Where an in rem action is before a competent court a decision
may be rendered against such property within the state without personal
jurisdiction over the defendant; however, although the decision is valid
as to property within the forum state, it is not entitled to full faith and
credit in a foreign state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 2 L. Ed. 1283
(1958).
47. See note 24 oup.
1963]
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over such foreign corporations where adverse consequences
are so highly inninent.4 8
JOHN KENNETH TOmLLSON
48. "The search for new frontiers too frequently leads the bold, the
dishonest, and the less discriminating to impose upon those who are
susceptible and who are ambitious to improve their status." People v.
McCabe, 60 Cal. App. 2d 492, 499, 141 P. 2d 54, 58 (1943).
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